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Ora et Labora' 
Thoughts on the Search for a Solution in 
Concordia 
Background. The theme 
Virtually not one single day passes by without a notice or two on some incident 
involving religious manifestations in schools or at places or work. 
Manifestations most often prompting intervention are displays of crosses (or 
crucifixes) and Muslim pieces of clothes, e.g. the Muslim scarf or more 
enveloping attire such as a burka. 
A few examples to illustrate! France vibrates over the expulsion in early 
October 2003 of sisters Alma and Lila Lévy, 18 and 16 years, from a 
public school because they insist on wearing a Muslim veil at school. 
Germany on September 24, 2003, learned of the ruling that day by its 
Constitutional Court declaring that the German constitution alone does 
not ban a Muslim teacher (Ms Ferestha Ludin) from veering a Muslin 
scarf in class at state schools. In 1995, on the other hand, that country 
had heard the same court declare unconstitutional the display of crosses 
and crucifixes in state schools rooms. Italy presently experiences furious 
protests against an October 18, 2003, decision by a court ordering a state 
school in Ofena to remove a crucifix from a schoolroom. Sweden on 
October 24, 2003, partook of a decision by its State School Agency 
allowing schools to ban the Muslim burka, a decision triggered by the 
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i  Qui orat et laborat, cor levat ad Dominum cum manibus ("Anyone who prays while working 
lifts the heart to God with his hands"). The sentence is part of a medieval hymn. The 
recommendation "Ora et labora" (Pray and work) is often quoted as the motto of the Benedictine 
Order. 
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appearance at the beginning of the school year in September of two girls 
wearing the burka. Switzerland on February 15, 2001, learned that the 
European Court of Human Rights had upheld a decision by the Swiss 
Constitutional Court (Tribunal fédéral) to forbid a Muslim teacher from 
wearing a Muslin scarf in a state school.' 
Religious diversity is fast becoming a reality of overriding importance in all 
western European countries, from southwest (Portugal) and northeast (Finland). 
A radically new situation emerges. To some extent it has already happened but 
as of today we are only beginning to realize the full impact of this new 
situation. 
We, the peoples of these parts of Europe, are ourselves at the origin of the 
new situation. The break-up of empires — the worldwide British and the French 
in North Africa — have brought people from them, reshaping the ethnic, cultural 
and religious composition of the mother countries in the process. Even greater 
inversions will be brought about by the rapidly changing demographic 
composition of the population caused by a seemingly unstoppable decrease in 
nativity rates. In all western European countries the birth rate has fallen far 
below the critical replacement level of 2,1 child per woman. No external forces 
have pressed the rate downwards: food is abundant, land is available, the labour 
market needs new hands, epidemics and other medical mass killers are under 
control et cetera. Internal factors account for the decline: gender equality, 
female control over their own bodies, contraceptives, female work force 
participation, a socio-economic structure in society increasingly calling for the 
two incomes family et cetera. To put it in proverbial terms: you've made your 
bed, now you lie on it. 
Most of us hail these internal developments as important victories for 
mankind. However, it has put us in a difficult situation: there are too few of us 
and we are greying. Immigration on a massive scale is rapidly becoming a 
factor to count with. However, prospective immigrants most easily available are 
often enough Muslim. In France Islam is by now the second largest religion. 
Millions of Muslims live in the midst of Europe. 
What have the legal responses been so far to this religious diversification? 
What should the answers be in the foreseeable future? These are the questions 
to be highlighted here. Only a few have been singled out. No attempt to provide 
a comprehensive treatment is made. Extreme brevity is de rigeur. 
2 France: see any number of web sites discussing the school case, e.g. by searching under the 
names of the girls or the name of the school (lycée Henri-Wallon d'Aubervilliers). Germany: 
Ludin case and Bavarian schoolroom cross case. Italy: any number of web sites, e.g. by 
searching under "schools, crucifixes, Ofena". Sweden: homepage (in English) of the State School 
Agency (www.skolverket.se/english/index.shtml)  "Schools given the go-ahead to ban burgas". 
Switzerland: Dahlab case. 
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The legal framework 
The 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(the Convention) of the Council of Europe is the supreme human rights code in 
Europe.' Article 9 of the Convention provides — inter alia — for freedom of 
religion. That article constitutes the legal framework for freedom of religion in 
all member states, regardless of whether domestic legislation to the same effect 
exits as well. 
Case law under Article 9 of the Convention distinguishes between the forum 
internum and the forum externum. The forum internum is "religion" itself and 
the forum externum is manifestations of "religion". The first limb is absolute, 
inviolable. There is no room for limitation or derogation. The second is 
derogable to some extent, subject to state regulation. How does case law 
distinguish between these two forums? Several issues are involved. First, what 
qualifies as "religion" and what is so loose and/or vague or haphazard that it 
cannot be said to be a "religion" (or "belief"), i.e. the horizontal length (or 
breadth), as it were? Case law has given the concept a broad definition. Second, 
what does the notion of an undisputed "religion" (or "belief") encompass, i.e. 
the vertical depth, as it were? Does "religion" entail only its core ideas and 
beliefs or does it encompass the ensuing way of life as well, at least to some 
extent? Case law is clear: the concept of "religion" is defined narrowly in this 
respect. "Religion" — the forum internum — has much horizontal breadth but 
little vertical depth. Third, to what extent can subjective feelings and opinions 
be taken into consideration? Under case law the borderline between the forum 
internum and the forum externum is defined objectively. 
This article is limited to the forum externum. Case law is markedly 
situational, i.e. the circumstances at hand are of very great importance, often 
decisive. For example, the outcome will be strongly influenced if secularism is 
a fundamental dogma in society (as reflected e.g. in Karaduman). 4 Thus, at 
least to some extent, the Convention allows countries to fashion their response 
to religious manifestations according to their basic notions of society. One 
cannot say for sure that the outcome in a case like Karaduman would have been 
different if the chain of events had unfolded in a country not based on 
secularism, e.g. Sweden. Case law offers no example for comparison. However, 
chances are that it would. In a country (e.g. Sweden) where people can wear 
religious garments on official documents like passports and driving licences, it 
' For an analytical discussion of relevant case law under the Convention see e.g. FAHLBECK, 
REINHOLD: Ora et Labora — On Freedom of Religion at the Work Place: A Stakeholder cum 
Balancing Factors Model, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial 
Relations, 2004:1. 
° In Karaduman the Commission upheld a decision to prohibit a Turkish student from 
appearing on an official university document wearing the Muslim scarf because, inter alia, it was 
against the fundamental principle of Turkey, i.e. the principle of secularism. 
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might very well be considered a violation of freedom of religion if a state 
university required photos without them. This means that rather diverging 
positions in the member states can be accepted under the Convention. 
Freedom of religion under the Convention covers both the freedom to have 
and to express religious opinions (the positive side) and the freedom not to have 
any religious beliefs and to be free from unwanted religious influence (the 
negative side). Negative freedom of religion is no less important under the 
Convention. It is protected to exactly the same extent as the positive.' Case law 
might seem to indicate that when there is a conflict between the two, the 
negative side prevails. However, that is misleading. The negative side is not a 
supra-norm, hierarchically superior to the positive side.' They are equal in 
scope. 
Religious multiplicity: less or more scope for religious manifestations? 
Has religious multiplicity lead to a stricter, less permissive, attitude towards 
religious manifestations in public schools and at places of work or to less 
strictness, more permissiveness? What route should be chosen in this respect 
for the foreseeable future? 
There cannot be any doubt but that increasing religious diversity has lead to 
a more permissive attitude towards open religious manifestations by people. 
The Muslim scarf has become a common sight in all western European 
countries and so have more elaborate Muslin accoutrements. The Sikh turban is 
a familiar sight in public. Public institutions in most countries have followed 
suit to some extent. 
' The leading case is Kokkinakis. Said the Court (para 31, in words reiterated time and again): 
"As enshrined in Article 9, freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations 
of a `democratic society' within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, 
one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of 
life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The 
pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been won over the centuries, 
depends on it". In the Buscarini case, the Court elaborated (para 34). "That freedom entails, inter 
alfa, freedom to hold or not to hold religious beliefs and to practise or not to practise a religion". 
6 The Bavarian Administrative Court (Bayerische Verwaltungsgericht), as quoted by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) correctly stated this in the 
Bavarian schoolroom cross case (p 4): "Das Spannungsverhiltnis zwischen positiver and 
negativer Religionsfreiheit müsse unter Berücksichtigung des Toleranzgebotes nach dem Prinzip 
der Konkordanz gelöst werden. Danach könnten die Beschwerdeführer nicht verlangen, daB ihrer 
negativen Bekenntnisfreiheit der absolute Vorrang gegenüber der positiven Bekenntnisfreiheit ... 
eingeraumt werde ..." 
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What course should be taken? The European Court presents the issue. 
"The Court recalls that freedom of thought, conscience and religion is one of 
the foundations of a `democratic society' within the meaning of the 
Convention. The pluralism indissociable from democratic society, which has 
been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it. It is true that in a democratic 
society it may be necessary to place restrictions on freedom of religion to 
reconcile the interests of the various religious groups (see the Kokkinakis 
judgement ... ). However, any such restriction must correspond to a `pressing 
social need' and must be `proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' (see, 
among others, the Wingrove v. the United Kingdom judgement ...)". 
"Although the Court recognizes that it is possible that tension is created in 
situations where a religious or any other community becomes divided, it 
considers that this is one of the unavoidable consequences of pluralism. The 
role of the authorities in such circumstances is not to remove the cause of 
tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups 
tolerate each other (see, mutatis mutandis, the Plattform " Árzte für das Leben v. 
Austria ...)".' 
The issue has reached the highest courts in Germany and in Switzerland. A 
Muslim teacher in Germany wanted to wear the Muslim scarf at school, even in 
class. School authorities and the administrative courts prohibited it, including 
the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht). The court 
expressly pointed at religious pluralism as a reason for taking a stricter, less 
permissive, position to religious manifestations in state schools (as an outflow 
of state neutrality in religious matters). 8 The Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungegericht) overturned the ruling. It stated that "(D)er mit 
zunehmender religiöser Pluralitat verbundene gesellschaftliche Wandel kann 
Anlass zu einer Neubestimmung des zuliissigen AusmaBes religiöser Bezüge in 
der Schule sein". 9 What direction should such new regulation take? The Court 
abstained from taking a position. It opened the way for diverging solutions in 
the various countries (Linder) of the Federal Republic. Said the Court (para 
65): 
"Es lieBen sich deshalb Gründe dafür anführen, die zunehmende religiöse 
Vielfalt in der Schule aufzunehmen and als Mittel für die Einübung von 
' Serif v. Greece, ECHR Reports 1999-IX (December 14, 1999), paras 49 and 53. The same 
wording is found in Agga v. Greece, Applications nos. 50776/99 and 52912/99 (October 17, 
2002). 
8  Said the Court (BverwG 2 C 21.01, July 4, 2002): "Deshalb gewinnt das Neutralitatsgebot 
mit wachsender kultureller und religiöser Vielfalt — bei einem wachsenden Anteil bekenntnisloser 
Schuler — zunehmend an Bedeutung und ist nicht etwa im Hinblick darauf auszulockern, dass die 
kulturelle, ethnische und religiöse Vielfalt in Deutschland inzwischen auch das Leben in der 
Schule pragt, wie die Klagerin meint". 
9 Ludin case, para 64. 
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gegenseitiger Toleranz zu nutzen, um so einen Beitrag in dem Bemühen um 
Integration zu leisten. Andererseits ist die beschriebene Entwicklung auch mit 
einem gröl3eren Potenzial möglicher Konflikte in der Schule verbunden. Es mag 
deshalb auch gute Gründe dafür geben, der staatlichen Neutralitdtspflicht im 
schulischen Bereich eine striktere and mehr als bisher distanzierende 
Bedeutung beizumessen ...". 
In the Dahlab case, the Swiss Government seems to have argued that 
pluralism calls for a stricter, less permissive attitude. 10 
What factors will decide regulation in member states and to what extent are 
they free to regulate as they wish? A few words will be said to answer these 
questions below (Parting words). 
Religion or culture? Degeneration 
Religious symbols are ubiquitous in most countries, differing in character 
according to the prevailing faith, for sure, but nevertheless everywhere to be 
found. The Christian cross (or crucifix) is one example, the Muslin scarf 
another. If considered to be religious they are protected by the European 
Convention but also restricted by it because of the negative freedom of others. 
If, on the other hand, they are cultural they do not enjoy protection by the 
Convention but, conversely, they are not restricted by it either and few 
countries, if any, restrict manifestations per se." This means that the scope for 
cultural manifestations is larger than for religious ones. 
Such considerations have been brought forward on several occasions to 
justify manifestations that some consider religious. For example, in the German 
case concerning the wearing of a Muslim scarf by a teacher in a public school, 
the majority of the members of the Constitutional Court found that "(D)as 
Kopftuch ist — anders als das christliche Kreutz (...) — nicht aus sick heraus ein 
religiöses Symbol". A minority was of another opinion, stating that "Zu sehr ist 
das Kreutz — fiber seine religiöse Bedeutung hinaus — ein allgemeines 
Kulturzeichen".' 2 Partly for that reason the majority accepted and the minority 
rejected the claim by the teacher that the scarf did not violate the constitutional 
state neutrality requirement in religious matters. Conversely, in the Swiss case 
concerning the Muslim scarf worn at a public school, the Federal Court had 
found that "it is scarcely conceivable to prohibit crucifixes ... and yet to allow 
1 ° Dahlab, p 459. 
I Exceptions exist, e.g. when manifestations violate some protected interest. Examples here 
are behaviour that is racist or discriminatory against certain people, e.g. because of sexual 
orientation. 
12 Ludin case, paras 50 and 113. 
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teachers themselves to wear powerful religious symbols of whatever 
denomination"." 
Similar arguments had been advanced with even more pregnancy in 
Germany in the Bavarian schoolroom cross case concerning crucifixes in state 
schoolrooms. The majority stated unequivocally that "(D)as Kreutz ist Symbol 
einer bestimmten religiösen Überzeugung and nicht etwa nur Ausdruck der 
vom Christentum mitgepragten abendldndischen Kultur". It went on to say that 
"(D)as Kreutz gehört nach wie vor zu den spezifischen Glaubenssymbolen des 
Christentums. Es ist geradezu sein Glaubenssymbol schlechthin". It concluded 
by saying that "(E)s ware eine dem Selbstverstdndnis des Christentums and der 
christlichen Kirchen zuwiderlaufende Profanisierung des Kreuzes, wenn man es 
als bloBen Ausdruck abendlandischer Tradition oder als kultisches Zeichen 
ohne spezifischen Glaubensbezug ansehen wollte". 14 
Another way of looking at the culture versus religion distinction is to 
consider the impact of manifestations and symbols on people at large. Frequent 
exposure to a prima facie religious manifestation reduces the religious impact 
of the exposure. Commonality and ubiquity will inevitably reduce the impact. 
The Christian cross offers an illustrative example. The cross has a central role 
in the Christian religion. The cross is per se a very powerful religious 
manifestation indeed and very distinctive. The intrinsic meaning of a piece of 
cloth like a Muslim scarf or a Sikh turban is insignificant compared to the 
extremely potent intrinsic meaning of the cross (and even more the crucifix). 
However, display of crosses is very common in public buildings in many 
countries, e.g. Italy and Poland. We are all so used to such display that the idea 
of invoking the negative freedom of religion in order not to have to be exposed 
to it might sometimes seem far-fetched. 
Of great importance is also the use of symbols in non-religious contexts. As 
is well known, people oblivious of any religious meaning of a cross wear 
crosses all over the world as small decorations. 
Both commonality and non-religious use mark steps on a road towards 
degeneration where manifestations lose their manifestation potential. One 
argument advanced by the minority in the Bavarian schoolroom cross case was 
that crosses are found everywhere in Bayern. A consequence, it was argued, 
was that "(U)nter solchen Verhdltnissen bleibt auch das Kreutz im 
Klassenzimmer in Rahmen des Üblichen". 15 
A "degeneration argument" was advanced in the Buscarini case. The case 
involved newly elected members of the legislative body in San Marino. They 
had to take an oath "on the Holy Gospels". They refused under Article 9 of the 
Convention. The Government argued that the oath "had lost its original 
13  Dahlab case, p 457. 
14  Bavarian schoolroom cross case, p 19 et seq. See also p 24. 
15  Ibidem, p 33. 
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religious character, as had certain religious feast-days which the state 
recognised as public holidays" and was now just "historical and social in 
significance and based on tradition" (para 32). The European Court did not 
agree. 
Is degeneration desirable? If harmonious coexistence, conflict avoidance, 
religious harmony and tolerance are values to be pursued, then walking the road 
of degeneration might be considered a sign of health and progress. To the 
religious person it may not seem so. However, the significance to the religious 
person of the symbol is not necessarily affected. The external degradation of 
his or her religious symbol becomes a price for its general acceptance. On the 
other hand, degeneration might reinforce gender inequality. The more accepted 
the Muslim scarf becomes the more difficult it might become for Muslim 
women not to wear it. Oppression might become mainstream, as it were! 
Religion or Gender Inequality? Female oppression 
Freedom of religion versus protection against gender discrimination is fast 
becoming an issue of overriding importance. The issue is divisive, to put it 
mildly. 
Dahlab is the only case before the European Court so far that deals with it. 
The question in this respect was: is the Muslim scarf an expression of freedom 
of religion or of discrimination of women? Is the scarf an expression of (male) 
oppression of women? 
Said the Court: "... it cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a 
headscarf ... appears to be imposed on women by a precept which is laid down 
in the Koran and which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the 
principle of gender equality. It therefore appears difficult to reconcile the 
wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, respect for 
others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that all teachers in a 
democratic society must convey to their pupils". With reference to Article 14 
(discrimination) the Court remarked "that the advancement of equality of the 
sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the Council of Europe. This 
means that very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a difference 
in treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the 
Convention". 16 
Can gender equality legislation be used to impose a ban on the Muslim 
scarf? Religious accoutrements are not limited to women. For example, the 
Sikh turban is worn mostly by men as is the Jewish kippa. It seems hard to 
believe that anyone would seriously consider banning them for reasons of 
gender equality. Why? The answer seems straightforward. They are worn 
16  Pp 463 and 464. 
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voluntarily, one feels. However, that is not a good answer since all these 
religious garments are involuntary in the sense that an external force, i.e. a 
religion, imposes them. So why consider banning the scarf but not the turban or 
the kippa? The answer seems to be that it is felt that the scarf is imposed by the 
men rather than by religion. This argument has much to speak for it. Muslim 
scholars are divided over the interpretation of the Koran and many Muslim 
communities and countries do not consider wearing a scarf a religious 
commandment. 
Nowhere in Europe is the situation tenser than in France. The reason, 
perhaps, is that France since 1905 has embraced an exceptionally strict 
separation between state and religion (laicité)." A heated debate takes place at 
the time of this writing. Where politicians and various pressure groups have 
until recently rejected the idea to legislate against the Muslim scarf (and 
perhaps other religious garments as well) in public schools and institutions, the 
mood seems to be changing. A few voices to illustrate! 
Ms Hanifa Cherifi is a member of the Haut Conseil de l'Intégration and a 
well-known public figure. Herself of Muslim origin she speaks out strongly 
against the scarf. Stating that "(L)e voile est un piége, qui isolise et 
marginalise" she says: "Cette idéologie est fondée sur 1'apartheid sexuel. Tous 
ceux qui réclament le port du voile le font au nom d'un islam rigoriste, non pas 
pour promouvoir les femmes".'' However, when asked if she favours a 
complete ban on the scarf at public schools, she is strongly negative. The result 
would be to exclude the girls from school altogether. "Pour moi les éléves 
voilées sont des victimes. Leur Occlusion de l'école n'est pas une solution 
satisfaisante. Elle pénalise ces personnel appartenant á des milieux 
défavorisés". 19 The scarf, she says, "est bien plus qu'une tenue vestimentaire. II 
renvoie á une restriction de la mixité, de la liberté individuelle, et met á mal 
l'égalité des sexes. Il faut donc s'interroger sur la signification du voile avant 
de se demander si c'est un libre choix ... "20 
Ms Chandorrt Djavann is an immigrant from Iran. There she wore the scarf 
but felt liberated when she took it off in France. In a much publicised book she 
ardently argues in favour of banning the scarf in public schools and offices and 
at places of work. 21 In her opinion "(L)e voile n'est pas moins grave que 
l'excision".22 
1' For short introductions to this and the ongoing debate in France see articles in The 
Economist, September 13, 2003, In the name of God — A survey of Islam and the West, p 14, and 
October 25, 2003, Islam in France — All over an inch ofjlesh, p 25. 
18  Le Monde, December 15, 2001, interview with Catherine Simon. 
19 L'Humanité, April 30, 2003, interview with Mina Kaci. 
2° Ibidem. 
21 DJAVANN, CHAHDORRT: Bas les voiles!, Editions NRF Gallimard, 2003. 
22  L'Humanité, October 9, 2003, interview with Dany Stive. 
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Nicolas Sarkozy, French Interior Minister, gave a speech on April 19, 2003, 
at the annual meeting of the Union des Organisations Islamiques de France. 
The speech sounds a little like reading the Riot Act to unruly minors! Said he: 
"La religion musulmane ne doit pas étre en France une religion á part. Elle doit 
trouver la place qui est la sienne comme les autres cultes reconnus depuis 
longtemps. Ni plus, ni moins. --- La laicité est un principe fondamental de notre 
République. --- Il ne peut y avoir en France d'Islam porteur d'un discours 
contraire aux valeurs Républicaines. Cet Islam est en France illégal et j'en 
tirerai toutes les conclusions. La loi de 1905 pose le principe que tout discours 
dans un lieu de culte qui inciterait á résister á l'application des lois ou á 
soulever une partie des citoyens contre les autres doit étre puni. Que nul ne 
doute qu'il sera. --- Cette loi est juste et elle s'applique á tous quelle que soit 
leur réligion. Elle s'applique tant aux imans qu'aux prétres ou aux rabbins sans 
distinction car it n'y a qu'une seule loi en France, la loi de la République. Et 
cette loi sera appliquée. --- La loi impose que sur une carte national d'identité, 
la photographie du titulaire soit téte nue que ce soit celle d'une femme ou d'un 
homme. Cette obligation est respectée par les religieuses catholiques, comme 
par toutes les femmes vivant en France. Rien ne justifierat que les femmes de 
confession musulmanes bénéficient d'une loi diffrerente. --- cette loi ne se 
négocie plus car elle est au coeur de la République. --- II n'y a pas de pratique 
qui puisse mettre en échec la loi de la République". 23 
President Jacques Chirac in a much publicised speech on October 22, 2003, 
declared that "(L)a laicité constitue pour chaque citoyen une protetction 
fondamentale, la garantie non seulement que ses propres convictions serons 
respectées, mais aussi que les convictions des autres ne lui seront jamais 
imposées". 24 
In the meantime a presidential commission is preparing a report on French 
secularism (laicité). Part of the task is to examine "l'égalité entre les sexes et la 
dignité de la femme". The commission is authorised to propose legislation. 25 
Gender equality legislation cannot be used to exclusively ban the scarf. If a 
ban were to be introduced it would have to cover all ostentatious religious 
garments, one must assume. The European Convention does not seem to be an 
obstacle to such legislation. Indeed, the German Federal Constitutional Court in 
the Ludin case opens the way for precisely such legislation in the various 
countries (Linder) of the German Federal Republic. At the present writing 
some countries have made public that such legislation is under consideration. 
In the previous section, it was suggested that allowing religious symbols to 
degenerate is perhaps not a bad idea. A ban on such symbols would inevitably 
23 The speech is available on the Net, e.g. at www.religioscope.info/article_143.shtml. 
24  The speech is available on the Net, e.g. at.www.mef.gc.ca/laicite-pas-negociable.htm.  
25  La Commission de Réflexion sur I' Application du Principe de Laicité, appointed July 3, 
2003, by President Jacques Chirac, chaired by Bernard Stasi (Commission Stasi). For brief 
information see articles referred to in note 18 above. 
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work against degeneration. This might be seen as something per se negative. 
The result might be to infuse tension rather than defuse it. On the other hand, 
degeneration might not be in the best interest of Muslim women. A ban on the 
scarf might help liberate Muslim women in the long run! 
Integration: uniformity or multiformity? 
An argument often advanced by people wanting to manifest a religious belief in 
a new environment is that it can promote integration into that environment. On 
one occasion an expert told the German Federal Constitutional Court that she 
had conducted a study of some of Muslim women. The women held that "(D)ie 
Bewahrung ihrer Differenz ist nach dem Verstdndnis der befragten Frauen 
Voraussetzung ihrer Integration". Indeed, the scarf was worn "um in einer 
Diasporasituation die eigene Identitiit zu bewahren". 26 
To the originators of that environment this argument might sound ludicrous. 
How can integration be promoted by behaving in a conspicuously different 
way? Does not the old adage "When in Rome, do as the Romans do" apply? To 
some extent the answer to such queries concern the meaning of "integration". 
Does it mean "assimilation" or does it mean something else, e.g. building one's 
own lifestyle according to the traditions of one's country of origin while 
simultaneously pursuing a lifestyle in terms of social and professional life that 
conforms to the population at large? 
Etymologically, the word "assimilation" is derived from the Latin word 
"similis", i.e. making similar. Uniformity is the goal of such assimilation. 
Immigrants have traditionally tried to immerse themselves into the existing 
social body in order to adjust as much as possible to the new environment. In 
recent times a rather different way of behaviour has become common. The 
Muslim women just quoted represent this new mode of comportment. 
Traditionally western European societies have promoted uniformity as a 
goal in itself, as an expression of a national "character". Uniformity — 
conformity - has provided both pride and protection. Nonconformity has been 
frowned upon. Social ostracism has met many a nonconformist. The very idea 
that one could become an accepted and full-fledged member of a society 
without adopting its mores has been quite alien, indeed virtually unthinkable. 
Membership in a community has meant conformity, uniformity: assimilation. 
Now a new concept is emerging, multiformity rather than uniformity, or 
unity through diversity. 
Will the freedom of religion article of the European Convention accept this 
trend? So far the Court has not been squarely called upon to assess the 
multiformity versus uniformity issue. However, the balance between positive 
26  Ludin case, para 52. 
122 — REINHOLD FAHLBECK 
and negative freedoms so far points in the direction that multiformity will not 
be easily accepted. The two freedoms cannot easily coexist if coexistence 
means actually sharing the same arena. One — or both — might have to their tune 
down its assertiveness. Karaduman exemplifies that. However, subsequent case 
law, Dahlab in particular, has introduced factors such as harmonious 
coexistence, conflict avoidance, religious harmony, tolerance and 
proportionality between manifestation and potential impact. These concepts are 
not all found in the Convention. They are, however, well known in the law of at 
least some member States, e.g. Germany and Switzerland. For example, the 
European Court quotes freely and extensively from the decision by the Swiss 
Federal Court in its ruling on the Dahlab situation. 
However, in all cases so far where positive and negative freedom of religion 
have been confronted, the result has been to prohibit the positive religious 
manifestation. Is it justified to say that when there is a confrontation the result 
is that the two sides of religious freedom neutralise each other, one effectively 
extinguishing the other? Are we concerned with a zero-sum game, as it were? 
So far the answer seems to be affirmative. If, however, notions like harmonious 
coexistence, conflict avoidance, religious harmony and tolerance, in particular, 
are to be given substantive meaning the outcome will be quite different. The 
Swiss Federal Court showed that when it discussed the impact of the 
powerfulness of the manifestation. Finding the Muslim headscarf a powerful 
manifestation, it notes that less powerful manifestations were accepted by 
school authorities, i.e. "discreet religious symbols at school, such as small 
pieces of jewellery". 27 The ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 
both the Bavarian schoolroom cross case and the Ludin case strongly argued in 
favour of compromises, tolerance and praktische Konkordanz. If achieved, 
integration can indeed mean multiformity rather than uniformity. It points at the 
possibility of a plus-sum game, as it were! 
Religious Multiplicity or Majority Rule? Majority versus minority 
Internally, European countries have traditionally been religiously rather unified. 
One religion has prevailed. Religious multiplicity was the exception. The 
exception has now become the rule but majority religions are still very much a 
characteristic. To what extent does the European Convention allow religious 
majorities to rule over religious minorities? 
Human rights are to a great extent minority rights. Majorities enjoy 
protection for their particular trait for the simple reason that they constitute a 
majority. There is a constant danger that religious majorities de facto or de jure 
suppress minority religions. In Karaduman the Commission pointed at this risk. 
27  Dahlab, quoting the Swiss decision. 
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Turkey is predominantly Muslim. Expressing Islam can thus exert particular 
and undue pressure on non-Muslims. Partly for that reason the Commission 
took a negative stand to the wearing of a Muslim scarf. Said the Commission: 
"Especially in countries where the great majority of the population owe 
allegiance to one particular religion, manifestation of the observances and 
symbols of that religion, without restriction as to place and manner, may 
constitute pressure on students who do not practice that religion or who adhere 
to another religion" (page 108). 
Indeed, minority protection runs as a main thread through case law under the 
Convention. No case has explicitly discussed majority religious expressions 
versus minority ones. There can be no doubt, however, that minority protection 
is a focal ingredient. 
The conflict between majority and minority has come to fore clearly in 
German case law. The Bavarian schoolroom cross case is illustrative. Bavaria 
is a staunchly catholic country. Under Bavarian rules there shall be a cross (or 
crucifix) in every public schoolroom. The German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) declared the rule unconstitutional. The Bavarian 
Government defended the rule by pointing at the strength of Catholicism in 
Bavaria and the fact that a majority of the Bavarian population had voted for a 
school system with Christian character (christliche Pragung). The cross was 
part of such a character. The Constitutional Court was not impressed. Pointing 
at the clash between the rights of minority and majority the Court said: "Der 
daraus entstehende Konflikt lal3t sich nicht nach dem Mehrheitsprinzip lösen, 
denn gerade das Grundrecht der Glaubensfreiheit bezweckt in besonderem 
MaBe den Schutz von Minderheiten". 2g Indeed, "(A)uf die ZahlenmüBige Starke 
oder die soziale Relevanz kommt es dabei nicht an ... Der Staat hat vielmehr auf 
eine am Gleichheitssatz orientierte Behandlung der verschiedenen Religions-
und Weltanschauungsgemein-schaften zu achten". 29 
However, this does not mean that there is no room for taking majority 
wishes into consideration. In the Ludin case the German Federal Constitutional 
Court delegated authority to regulate religious manifestations in public schools 
to the various countries (Lönder) of the Federation. These have different 
religious compositions. Tolerance and compromise must be promoted. 
However, differences in religious composition "schlieSt ein, dass die einzelnen 
Under zu verschiedenen Regelungen kommen können, weil bei dem zu 
findenden Mittelweg auch Schultraditionen, die konfessionelle Zusammen-
setzung der Bevölkerung and ihre mehr oder weniger starke religiöse 
Verwurzelung berücksichtigt werden dürfen". 30 
28  Bavarian schoolroom cross case, p 24. 
29 Ibidem p 17. 
30  Ludin case, para 47. 
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There is every reason to believe that the European Court will arrive at an 
identical (or very similar) result when confronted with the issue. The position 
of the German Constitutional Court is in perfect accordance with the situational 
character of case law under the Convention. Religious multiplicity with due — 
but not overdue — regard for the majority seems to be the position to be 
expected. A principle of proportionality, of a kind! 
Private versus Public Spheres. A World Apart? 
State neutrality and separation between state and religion have been crucial in 
many, indeed most, relevant court cases under Article 9 in the Convention and 
under member state law. The state neutrality requirement is absent in private 
institutions, e.g. private workplaces. 
What is the position of the Convention to religious manifestations at such 
workplaces? No case law exists. However, the structure of the Convention 
provides some guidance. The Convention imposes on the member States an 
obligation to positively promote the enjoyment of the rights contained in the 
Convention. This obligation is not restricted to situations where the State itself 
is a party. Extensive anti-discrimination legislation in member countries in the 
recent past is one way of fulfilling that obligation, for example rules mandating 
employers to actively promote religious diversity at the workplace. 
Case law under the Convention also provides guidance. The first 
observation is that private employers are not constrained by considerations 
concerning religious neutrality. By and large they can give their business any 
profile they like. If they want their business to have a certain religious character 
they are free to act accordingly. A consequence of this is that courts have much 
wider frames to decide cases involving religious manifestations. Second, the 
arguments and discussions in case law is applicable to a great extent to the 
private sector as well. 
This seems to be as much as can be said with certainty at present. It is not 
much! 
Some case law exists in the member States. The Muslim salesclerk case, 
decided by the German Federal Labour Court (Bundesarbeitsgericht) in 
October 2002, is of particular import. The reasoning of the German court is 
detailed and analytical. The court quickly passes over the neutrality argument 
invoked by the employer and introduces a novel approach to the resolution of 
freedom of religion disputes in private employment. The reasoning is very 
much in line with European Court reasoning. Highly likely, this ruling will, in 
turn, influence the Court. 
The court came to the conclusion that the termination of a woman, who 
announced her intention to start wearing a headscarf, was not justified. The 
constitutionally protected freedom of religion of the woman outweighed the 
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business interests of the employer, though also protected by the German 
Constitution. The employer claimed that it feared considerable business 
problems. Since the employee had not debuted in her scarf when she was 
terminated, no such problems had yet been encountered. For this reason the 
German court found that the dismissal was not socially justified (sozial 
gerechtfertigt). Misgivings and sheer conjecture (bloJ3e Vermutungen and 
Befürchtungen) are not enough to set aside constitutional rights, in particular 
since these could not be substantiated by experience from elsewhere. For that 
reason there was no need to consider in detail how to balance the opposing, 
constitutionally protected, positions of the parties. 
Obiter dicta, the court engaged in a detailed discussion how to balance 
competing interests in order to arrive at a constitutionally acceptable accord 
(praktische Konkordanz). 31 
A similar ruling in France in October 2003 has also attracted widespread 
attention. 32 
An employee had worn the scarf for many years. She was transferred to 
company headquarters but had no direct contact with customers. No incident 
involving customers had occurred. However, she was terminated when she 
refused to wear her scarf less ostentatiously. The company claimed that it had 
acted out of "neutralité". Just like the German court, the French court dismissed 
that argument. On the contrary, it found the termination could not be justified 
by "des elements objectifs, étrangers á toute discrimination". 
The private workplace is indeed a world apart from the public, at least in 
countries where state neutrality is an important factor. 
However, workplaces are not arenas for religious manifestations. On the 
other hand, employees are by and large at liberty to dress as they like. A 
balance has to be struck between competing interests. What factors are 
relevant? A few words will be said in the parting section. 
Parting words 
A trend towards banning conspicuous religious manifestations in schools or at 
places of work would mean that religious pluralism results in a stricter, less 
permissive, interpretation of state neutrality in religious matters. In the same 
vein it would tend to protect religious symbols against degeneration. In the long 
run it might promote Muslim female liberation from oppressive requirements to 
wear specific garments. It would promote uniformity over multiformity. It 
31 For a discussion see FAHLaECK: op. cit. footnote 3 above. 
32  The Dalila Tahri case, La Cour d'Appel de Paris, October 9, 2003. Ample information is 
available on the Net, e.g. by using a search motor like Yahoo and searching under the name Dalila 
Tahri. 
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would be inimical to the advancement of minority rights. A trend towards 
allowing such manifestations to a greater extent would have the opposite effects 
(though possibly with a negative side-effect for Muslim women). 
What factors will decide case law under the Convention and regulation in 
member states concerning religious manifestations in schools and at places of 
work? To what extent are member states free to regulate as they wish? Several 
factors stand out. 
First, tolerance and compromise. As has been said the Convention covers 
both freedom to have and to express religious opinions (the positive side) and 
freedom not to have any religious beliefs and to be free from unwanted 
religious influence (the negative side). Regulation that violates either side is in 
contravention of the Convention. This limits the range of legislative action, 
working in favour of tolerance and compromise. As has also been shown, the 
Convention favours pluralism. As of late, in particular in Dahlab, the European 
Court has introduced concepts like tolerance and compromise. The task ahead 
is to make them operational in order to strike a balance between opposing but 
per se legitimate rights, e.g. positive versus negative freedom or positive 
freedom versus parental rights to choose education for their children. 
Second, situational solutions. As has been pointed out, case law is 
situational. Basic values and norms in a given society are allowed to influence 
Court rulings and statutory regulation. It is a big difference between on the one 
hand states that make secularism a basis for society and centre society around it 
and on the other hand states that do not (though they are secular). France and 
Turkey exemplify the first group, the Nordic countries the latter. Even per se 
rather inconspicuous and innocent religious manifesta-tions can assume grave 
proportions in the one kind of society but not in the other. Case law accepts 
such considerations (e.g. the Karaduman case). Comparatively restrictive 
regulation is likely in strongly secularist countries with permissive regulation at 
the other end of the spectrum. 
Situational solutions are mandated also by concern for the smooth conduct 
of business. The Muslim teacher case illustrates that. A public body (as in the 
Muslim teacher case) or an employer has the right — and indeed the obligation, 
in some instances — to see to it that business can be conducted in the proper 
way. 
Third, proportionality. As is well known proportionality permeates 
interpretation of the whole Convention. In Dahlab the Court points at the 
proportionality between manifestation and potential impact. 
Fourth, as has been said the Convention imposes on member states an 
obligation to promote religion. Legislation in the various member states must 
take that into account. As has also been said, legislation in member states have 
already done so to a consider-able extent. 
Fifth, gender equality is an overriding interest in Europe. The issue of 
gender equality versus religious manifestations has probably not been squarely 
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dealt with so far in any European country and certainly not by the European 
Court. Here, legislators and courts will find themselves in a minefield both 
legally and morally. Gender equality is not flexible, not a phenomenon that can 
be realized in proportional degrees. On the whole, it's there or it's not there. 
Religious manifestations, on the other hand, are flexible in terms of ostentation 
and conspicuousness. Freedom of religion in terms of symbols and 
manifestations can be realized in proportional degrees. Perhaps that difference 
can provide direction. Proportionality is after all one of the building blocs of 
the Convention. 
In all these five respects a balance has to be struck. The balance will have to 
involve all the various stakeholders and their opposing interests." At the end of 
the road lies the goal: praktische Konkordanz, entente cordial, a viable concord, 
a mode of life that allows religious minded people to follow the invitation: Ora 
et Labora in Concordia! 
Principal Cases (with headwords and short summaries) 
Convention cases: 
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Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht), BVerfG, 2 BvR 
1437/02 (September 24, 2003), Ludin case 
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problems were so far only anticipated. 
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REINHOLD FAHLBECK 
ORA ET LABORA. GONDOLATOK AZ EGYETÉRTÉSBEN 
HOZOTT MEGOLDÁSÉRT 
(Összefoglalás) 
A vallási sokszínűség mára a legtöbb európai államban mindennapossá vált. 
Egyre megszokottabbak és egyre több figyelmet vonnak magukra a különböző 
vallási megnyilvánulások és jelképek az iskolákban és a munkahelyeken. A 
tanulmány ezt az új helyzetet vitatja meg röviden. Két kérdést tárgyal. 1 . 
Milyen reakciókat váltott ki ez a folyamat a jog területén. 2. Milyen további 
reakciók várhatók. A tanulmány középpontjában az 1950-es európai emberi jogi 
egyezmény és az Európai Bíróság ítélkezési gyakorlata áll. A kérdések 
ellentétpárokon keresztül kerülnek bemutatásra. Tágabb vagy szűkebb játékteret 
biztosít-e a vallási sokszínűség a vallási megnyilvánulások számára? A kultúra 
vagy a vallás körébe tartoznak-e az egyes megnyilvánulások és jelképek? 
Veszélyeztetik-e egyes vallási szokások a nők és férfiak egyenjogúságát? Mi a 
bevándorlási politika célja, az egyformaság biztosítása, vagy a sokféleség 
létrehozása? Uralkodik-e a vallási többség a vallási kisebbségek fele tt? Eltérő 
válasz adandó-e ezekre a kérdésekre állami és nem állami intézmények 
esetében? Végezetül a fenti kérdések megválaszolásának módszertanához ad 
néhány támpontot a tanulmány. 
